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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
James Gerald Beck appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional plea of guilty to possession of a controlled substance. Beck claims 
the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
While on patrol in Boise, Officer Viens stopped a bicyclist who was riding 
without a headlight as required by Boise city code. (9/19/12 Tr., p. 24, L. 10 - p. 
25, L. 7.) It was around 11 :30 p.m. (9/19/12 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 15-17.) Viens asked 
the bicyclist if he had a front headlight, and the bicyclist responded that he did 
not yet. (Exhibit 1 (audio recording); 9/19/12 Tr., p. 25, Ls. 18-21.) Viens 
identified the bicyclist from his Idaho identification card as James Beck. (Exhibit 
1; 9/19/12 Tr., p. 25, L. 22 - p. 26, L. 5.) 
Less than 30 seconds into the stop, Viens asked Beck if he had been in 
trouble before, and then if he had any active warrants. (Exhibit 1; 9/19/12 Tr., p. 
26, L. 23 - p. 27, L. 9.) Beck responded that he had been in trouble for burglary 
in the past, but did not think he had any active warrants. (9/19/12 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 
2-11.) About 35 to 45 seconds into the stop, Officer Martinez arrived. (9/19/12 
Tr., p. 28, Ls. 10-20.) At roughly 45 seconds, Viens asked dispatch to run a 
criminal background check on Beck. (9/19/12 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 12-24.) Viens 
asked Beck where he was coming from and going to; Beck responded he was 
coming from work and on his way home. (Exhibit 1; 9/19/12 Tr., p. 26, Ls 18-22.) 
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About a minute and 10 seconds into the stop, Viens asked Beck if he was 
on probation or parole, and Beck said he was not anymore, but had "topped out 
in 2005." (Exhibit 1; 9/19/12 Tr., p. 28, L. 21 - p. 29, L. 2.) When asked, Beck 
told Viens he was last arrested two years prior. (9/19/12 Tr., p. 29, Ls. 3-7.) 
During their exchange, Viens received Beck's information from dispatch 
confirming that Beck had a criminal history. (9/19/12 Tr., p. 29, Ls. 12-19.) At 
about one-and-a-half minutes into the stop, Viens repeated to Beck, "gotta have 
a headlight, man." (Exhibit 1.) 
Just over two minutes into the stop, and right after Viens received 
information back from dispatch, Viens asked Beck if he had anything illegal on 
him. (Exhibit 1; 9/19/12 Tr., p. 29, Ls. 20-23.) Beck responded by asking, "am I 
going to jail?" (Exhibit 1.) After Viens repeated his question, Beck answered 
yes, and said it was a diabetic syringe. (Exhibit 1; 9/19/12 Tr., p. 30, Ls. 2-9.) 
Viens followed by asking Beck if he had anything else, specifically "meth," and 
Beck nodded affirmatively. (Exhibit 1; 9/19/12 Tr., p. 30, Ls. 14-22.) 
Viens handcuffed Beck and conducted a search of Beck's person. 
(9/19/12 Tr., p. 31, Ls. 2-23.) In the search, Viens found a syringe and a small 
plastic baggie of a crystalline substance. (9/19/12 Tr., p. 32, Ls. 7-8.) From the 
initial stop to when Beck was handcuffed, approximately three minutes passed. 
(9/19/12 Tr., p. 33, Ls. 11-12; Exhibit 1.) 
The state charged Beck with possession of methamphetamine and 
possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp. 23-24.) Beck moved to suppress the 
state's evidence. (R., pp. 26-27, 36-41.) At a hearing on the motion, Viens and 
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Beck both testified. (9/19/12 Tr.; R., p. 50.) At the conclusion of the testimony, 
Beck's counsel conceded, 
the stop didn't exceed what was necessary to carry out the purpose 
of the stop. I don't think there is any question that that is probably 
true. A typical infraction would probably take ten or 15 minutes to 
write out and that interaction was fairly brief. So I concede that. 
(9/19/12 Tr., p. 52, Ls. 19-25.) Counsel repeatedly characterized the "very 
narrow issue" before the court as whether questions asked by Officer Viens were 
carefully tailored to the purpose of the stop. (9/19/12 Tr., p. 46, L. 8 - p. 49, L. 
21; p. 53, Ls. 1-12.) 
Finding that Beck "conceded the duration of the stop was reasonable," the 
district court concluded that Viens' questions were not an impermissible 
expansion of the stop. (R., p. 55.) The district court thus denied Beck's motion. 
(R., pp. 53-56.) Beck then entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of 
methamphetamine, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression 
motion. (R., pp. 59-60.) The district court sentenced Beck to seven years with 
two years fixed. (R., pp. 71-73.) Beck timely appealed. (R., pp. 75-77.) 
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ISSUE 
Beck states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Beck's motion to suppress the 
State's evidence? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Beck failed to show that the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
Beck Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion 
To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Beck argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 5-14.) According to Beck, Officer Viens unreasonably 
extended the duration of his stop by asking questions unrelated to the stop's 
purpose. (Appellant's brief pp. 5-14.) However, at his suppression hearing, 
Beck's trial counsel expressly waived the issue whether Viens unreasonably 
extended the stop's duration, conceding, "the stop didn't exceed what was 
necessary to carry out the purpose for the stop." (9/19/12 Tr., p. 52, Ls. 19-21.) 
In making these closing comments to the court, Beck conceded that "the 
duration of the stop was reasonable." (R., p. 55.) 
Relying on Beck's concession, the district court concluded that "Officer 
Viens did not impermissibly expand the scope of questioning beyond the original 
justification for the stop," and denied the motion to suppress. (R., pp. 55-56.) 
Thus, the district court reached its decision without making an independent 
determination whether the duration of the stop was reasonable. Because Beck 
expressly waived the issue whether the duration of the stop was reasonable, 
there was no adverse ruling on the issue about which Beck can assert error on 
appeal. And Beck's attempt to deny that concession and reframe it as an 
erroneous finding by the district court fails. 
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Alternatively, even if this Court addresses Beck's appellate claim that 
Viens' questioning unreasonably prolonged the duration of the stop, the claim 
fails. Application of the law to the facts shows no Fourth Amendment violation. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing a district court's ruling on a suppression motion, the appellate 
court accepts the district court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous, but 
freely reviews the application of law to those facts. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 
576, 592, 261 P.3d 853, 869 (2011) (citation omitted). 
C. Beck's Trial Counsel Conceded That The Duration Of The Stop Was 
Reasonable, Thus He Cannot Show The District Court Erred Or That This 
Court Should Otherwise Consider The Issue, Which He Expressly Waived 
Below 
Beck moved to suppress evidence obtained in Officer Viens' investigative 
detention, asserting the detention was unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment. (R., pp. 36-41.) The Fourth Amendment protects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 
878 (1975); State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012). "An 
investigative detention is a seizure of limited duration to investigate suspected 
criminal activity." State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641,644, 181 P.3d 1249, 1252 
(Ct. App. 2008) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). There is no Fourth 
Amendment violation where an officer conducts an investigative detention with a 
"reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity [is] afoot," based on facts 
available at the time. ~ An investigative detention supported by reasonable 
suspicion must be temporary and last no longer than "necessary to effectuate 
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the purpose of the stop." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). "[G]eneral 
questioning on topics unrelated to the purpose of the stop is permissible so long 
as it does not expand the duration of the stop." Stewart, 145 Idaho at 647, 181 
P.3d at 1255 (citing State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 362, 17 P.3d 301, 306 
(Ct. App. 2000)). 
At his suppression hearing, Beck's counsel conceded the reasonableness 
of his stop's duration, offering in final comments to the district court: 
I'll concede that the stop didn't exceed what was 
necessary to carry out the purpose for the stop. I don't think 
there is any question that that is probably true. A typical infraction 
would probably take ten or 15 minutes to write out and that 
interaction was fairly brief. So I concede that. 
(9/19/12 Tr., p. 52, Ls. 16-25 (emphasis added).) Counsel's choice of words 
largely mirrors the language used by the United States Supreme Court in Royer, 
460 U.S. at 500. Beck's trial counsel then told the district court that the issue 
was "whether or not the questioning was carefully tailored to the purpose for the 
stop." (9/19/12 Tr., p. 53, Ls. 1-12; see also 9/19/12 Tr., p. 46, L. 8-p. 49, L. 
21.) "Defendant having conceded the duration of the stop was reasonable," the 
district court concluded Viens' questions were within the scope of the "original 
justification for the stop," and denied the suppression motion. (R., pp. 55-56.) 
For the first time on appeal, Beck challenges the district court's finding 
that trial counsel conceded the duration of the stop was reasonable. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 7-8.) Beck now asserts that his trial counsel - despite his 
unambiguous comments - "never abandoned the claim that Officer Viens' 
questions temporarily extended the stop in a manner which was unreasonable." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.) Beck contends that his characterization of trial counsel's 
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closing comments is "consistent with the memorandum filed in support of his 
suppression motion." (Appellant's brief, p. 8.) Beck's argument is irrelevant. 
The district court found that trial counsel made the concession at issue "in 
closing argument at the hearing on the suppression motion." (R., p. 55.) The 
record supports this finding. That Beck now wishes to advance the argument he 
made in briefing before the suppression hearing does not show clear error in the 
district court's finding that the argument was conceded by counsel at that 
hearing. See Draper, 151 Idaho at 592, 261 P.3d at 869. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has declined to address an issue that was 
raised in briefing to the trial court, but expressly waived at oral argument before 
the trial court. Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Cy. of Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405, 409, 
258 P.3d 340, 344 (2011 ). This is appropriate because, "[t]o raise an issue on 
appeal, the record must contain an adverse ruling to form the basis for 
assignment of error and this Court will not consider or review an issue raised for 
the first time on appeal." Magnuson Properties Partnership v. City of Coeur 
D'Alene, 138 Idaho 166, 170, 59 P.3d 971, 975 (2002) (citation omitted). The 
record here contains no adverse ruling to which Beck can assign error. The 
district court denied Beck's suppression motion based on Beck's trial counsel's 
concession, without making a determination on the issue. Because the issue 
was not ruled upon by the court below, it is inappropriate for review by this Court 
on appeal under well-established applicable law. 
To the extent Beck argues the district court erred in concluding Beck's 
stop was reasonable in duration, his argument fails under the doctrine of invited 
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error. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-13.) Under the doctrine, a party is estopped "from 
asserting an error when his or her own conduct induces the commission of the 
error." State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 915, 265 P.3d 519, 528 (Ct. App. 2011) 
(citation omitted). The district court's determination that "the duration of the stop 
was reasonable" rested upon the express language of Beck's closing comment 
at oral argument that "the duration of the stop did not exceed what was 
necessary for the purpose of the stop." (R., p. 55; 9/19/12 Tr., p. 52, Ls. 19-21.) 
Because the district court's allegedly erroneous determination resulted from 
Beck's trial counsel's argument, the invited error doctrine estops Beck from 
asserting error. 
Given the unequivocal concession by Beck's trial counsel that the duration 
of the stop was reasonable, Beck has failed to show the district court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress. Further, Beck has failed to show this Court 
should consider the reasonableness of his stop's duration - an issue he 
expressly waived below, and for which there is therefore no adverse ruling for 
' 
this Court to review. 
D. Even If The Court Considers Beck's Appellate Claim, Application Of The 
Law To The Facts Shows That Viens' Questioning Did Not Unreasonably 
Prolong Beck's Detention 
Even if this Court finds that Beck's trial counsel did not concede that the 
duration of his stop was reasonable, the record supports such a finding. "Where 
the lower court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory, [the appellate] 
Court will affirm the order on the correct theory." Markel lnt'I. Ins. Co., Ltd. v. 
Erekson, 153 Idaho 107,113,279 P.3d 93, 99 (2012) (citation omitted). 
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Applying the law to the facts, there was no Fourth Amendment violation resulting 
from Beck's detention. 
In determining the reasonableness of a detention, the courts are guided 
by "common sense and ordinary human experience." Stewart, 145 Idaho at 645-
46, 181 P.3d at 1253-54 (citing U.S. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985), and U.S. v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989)). "[B]rief inquiries not otherwise related to the 
initial purpose of the stop do not necessarily violate a detainee's Fourth 
Amendment rights." State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 
(Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted). The United States Supreme Court has held, 
"An officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop 
... do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so 
long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop." 
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009). 
Less than two months after Arizona v. Johnson was decided, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals held, "if an officer questions a driver about matters unrelated to 
the traffic stop after the purpose of the stop has been fulfilled, the questioning, 
no matter how short, extends the duration of the stop and is an unwarranted 
intrusion." State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 8,217 P.3d 1, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). But 
Beck has not shown that the purpose of his stop was fulfilled. 
"Brief, general questions about drugs and weapons, in and of 
themselves, do not extend an otherwise lawful detention." State v. Grantham, 
146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Parkinson, 135 
Idaho at 362-63, 17 P.3d at 306-07. A request to search a suspect's truck 
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before handing the suspect a written citation for speeding, which was the basis 
for the initial stop, did not unlawfully extend the stop in State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 
848, 853, 11 P.3d 44, 49 (Ct. App. 2000). In that case, the Court recognized that 
police officers have some discretion in procedures for conducting traffic stops. 
& (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n. 6 (1977)). The Silva 
Court held, "The additional second or two that [the officer] took to ask for consent 
[to conduct a search] and in which Silva replied in the affirmative was objectively 
reasonable." & 
Here, the additional second or two that it took Viens to ask Beck if he had 
anything illegal on him and in which Beck replied in the affirmative, was also 
objectively reasonable. (Exhibit 1.) When Beck answered in the affirmative, 
Viens had reasonable grounds to follow up with further questions about illegal 
items in his possession, even if unrelated to Beck's lack of a front headlight. See 
Grantham, 146 Idaho at 496, 198 P3d at 134. Viens' questions did not 
"measurably extend" his stop, but were brief, general inquiries within a 
reasonable timeframe and before the conclusion of Beck's stop. See Johnson, 
555 U.S. at 333; Grantham, 146 Idaho at 496, 198 P.3d at 134; Silva, 134 Idaho 
at 853, 11 p.3d at 49. Because the record supports that the duration of Beck's 
detention was reasonable, this Court should affirm the district court's order. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying Beck's motion to suppress. 
DATED this 18th day of November, 2013. 
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